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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Qualified immunity protects government officials from 
being held liable for damages when their conduct does not 
violate a citizen’s clearly established rights. As the Supreme 
Court has noted, qualified immunity advances a policy of 
“shield[ing] officials from harassment, distraction, and liability 
when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
 
 The issue here is whether New Jersey State Trooper 
Noah Bartelt is entitled to qualified immunity after using 
deadly force against Willie Gibbons, a suspect who refused to 
drop his gun when Trooper Bartelt ordered him to do so. 
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Gibbons’s mother (Arlane James) and minor children (J. R. G., 
D. K. L., and L. M. G.) (collectively, “James”) filed an action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Trooper Bartelt and other state 
actors alleging constitutional violations arising from Trooper 
Bartelt’s use of force against Gibbons. All individual 
defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity. The District Court granted qualified immunity to all 
individual defendants except Trooper Bartelt. The District 
Court then denied James’s and Trooper Bartelt’s cross-motions 
for reconsideration.  
 
 Trooper Bartelt is entitled to qualified immunity 
because he did not violate Gibbons’s clearly established rights. 
Thus, we will reverse the District Court’s denial of qualified 
immunity to Trooper Bartelt and remand with instructions to 
grant judgment in his favor. 
 
I 
 
 Trooper Bartelt appeals the District Court’s order 
denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity 
under the “collateral-order doctrine.” See E. D. v. Sharkey, 928 
F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2019).1 Under this doctrine, our review 
is plenary and “strictly limited to the legal questions involved.” 
In re Montgomery Cty., 215 F.3d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 2000). We 
lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s determination 
that a factual dispute is genuine, but we have jurisdiction to 
consider whether the disputed fact is material to the issue on 
which a party sought summary judgment. See Davenport v. 
Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2017); see 
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Thus, we accept the District Court’s 
facts as true for purposes of this appeal, see id., and we will 
review “the record to determine what [other] facts the [D]istrict 
[C]ourt . . . likely assumed,” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 
319 (1995).  
 
 
1 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have jurisdiction over this 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral-order 
doctrine. See E. D., 928 F.3d at 305. 
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II 
 
Willie Gibbons lived with Angel Stephens in Bridgeton, 
New Jersey. After the two had a domestic argument on May 
24, 2011, Stephens called 911 and reported that “[Gibbons] hit 
her” and that Gibbons had a “gun in his truck.” A12–13. The 
police drove to Stephens’s house, and Stephens and Gibbons 
each completed written statements describing the incident. 
Stephens then obtained a temporary restraining order from 
Fairfield/Downe Joint Municipal Court against Gibbons. The 
order prohibited Gibbons from possessing firearms and from 
returning to Stephens’s house. 
 
 The next day, on May 25, 2011, Gibbons requested a 
police escort to retrieve possessions from Stephens’s house, 
but the police informed him that he needed judicial approval 
for the visit. Gibbons went to Stephens’s house alone anyway, 
in violation of the court’s temporary restraining order. Another 
argument followed between Gibbons and Stephens. Stephens 
was speaking with a friend on the phone at the time, so the 
friend called the police to report that Gibbons had violated the 
restraining order. Gibbons then left Stephens’s house.  
 
 Trooper Philip Conza soon arrived at the house and 
Stephens told him that Gibbons had waved a gun throughout 
their argument. Trooper Conza told Stephens to make a 
complaint against Gibbons at the police barracks and reported 
over the police radio that Gibbons had brandished a firearm. 
Trooper Conza, joined by Troopers Bartelt and Michael 
Korejko, then searched for Gibbons at the nearby home of 
Gibbons’s mother, Arlane James. James told the Troopers that 
she did not know where Gibbons was and that he may be off 
his medication.2 
 
 While Stephens was driving to the barracks, she saw 
Gibbons walking alongside the road. She called 911 and 
reported Gibbons’s location. Troopers Bartelt, Conza, and 
Korejko, along with Trooper Daniel Hidder responded to the 
location. 
 
2 Gibbons was diagnosed with schizophrenia and had been 
prescribed medication to treat this condition. 
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 When Trooper Bartelt pursued Gibbons, he knew that 
Gibbons: (1) had violated a restraining order; (2) was in 
possession of a firearm that he had brandished within the last 
hour; and (3) was reportedly mentally ill and may not have 
been taking his medication.3 
 
Trooper Bartelt was the first officer to engage Gibbons. 
As Trooper Bartelt approached Gibbons by car (with his 
window down), he heard Gibbons say, “stay away from me.” 
A16. Trooper Bartelt then parked his car and, while exiting, 
observed that Gibbons was holding a gun in his left hand and 
pointing it at his own head. Trooper Bartelt drew his weapon, 
stood behind his car door, twice told Gibbons to drop his 
weapon, and ordered him to “come over here.” Id. Gibbons did 
not comply with the commands and may have repeated, “stay 
away from me.” Id. Separated by seven to fifteen yards, 
Trooper Bartelt then shot Gibbons twice. Trooper Bartelt shot 
Gibbons within seconds of stopping his car. Trooper Conza 
arrived on the scene before Trooper Bartelt fired the shots. 
Troopers Korejko and Hidder arrived shortly after. Gibbons 
was flown to the hospital but died that night. 
 
III 
 
Trooper Bartelt challenges the District Court’s ruling 
denying him qualified immunity. Qualified immunity has two 
prongs. “First, a court must decide ‘whether the facts that a 
plaintiff has . . . shown make out a violation of a constitutional 
right.’” Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 637 
(3d Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Pearson, 555 
U.S. at 232). “And second, the court must determine ‘whether 
the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of 
defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” Id. We may begin with 
either prong. Id. 
 
 The District Court held that Trooper Bartelt failed to 
satisfy both prongs, so he was not entitled to qualified 
 
3 The District Court did not specifically find these three facts. 
But because these facts are undisputed by the parties, we find 
that they are among the facts that the District Court “likely 
assumed.” See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319. 
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immunity. On appeal, Trooper Bartelt argues that the District 
Court erred by finding that he may have violated one of 
Gibbons’s constitutional rights and by concluding that the 
constitutional right was clearly established.  
 
We will not review the District Court’s holding that 
Trooper Bartelt may have violated a constitutional right—the 
first prong of qualified immunity. The District Court based this 
holding on its conclusion that “genuine issues of disputed fact” 
existed, but it did not identify these disputed facts. See A30. To 
the extent that the District Court is correct that these unstated 
facts are material to the inquiry, we lack jurisdiction under the 
collateral-order doctrine to review its holding on this prong. 
See Davenport, 870 F.3d at 278; see also Johnson, 515 U.S. at 
319. Thus, we will assume without deciding that Trooper 
Bartelt violated one of Gibbons’s constitutional rights and 
proceed to qualified immunity’s second prong.4 
 
IV 
 
 Qualified immunity’s second prong “shields officials 
from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 
S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231). 
 
 
4 To aid our review in qualified immunity cases, we announced 
a supervisory rule in Forbes v. Township of Lower Merion for 
all cases “in which a summary judgment motion based on 
qualified immunity is denied on the ground that material facts 
are subject to genuine dispute.” 313 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 
2002). Under Forbes’s supervisory rule, district courts must 
“specify those material facts that are and are not subject to 
genuine dispute and explain their materiality.” Id.  
 Here, the District Court found that genuine disputes of 
material fact precluded it from concluding whether Trooper 
Bartelt violated one of Gibbons’s constitutional rights. But it 
did not specify which material facts were in dispute or explain 
their materiality. We reiterate that Forbes’s supervisory rule 
remains in effect. See E. D., 928 F.3d at 310–11 (Smith, C.J., 
concurring). 
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 “Clearly established means that, at the time of the 
officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is 
unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 
(2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 
inquiry is an “objective (albeit fact-specific) question,” under 
which “[an officer]’s subjective beliefs . . . are irrelevant.” 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). Because the 
inquiry is from the perspective of a reasonable officer, we 
“consider[] only the facts that were knowable to the defendant 
officer[].” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (citation 
omitted). 
 
In rare cases, a plaintiff may show that a right is clearly 
established if the “violation [is] ‘obvious.’” See Brosseau v. 
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 
536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)). In the excessive-force context, 
“obvious cases” are those that obviously violate Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 
U.S. 1 (1985). See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199. “[Graham] 
clearly establishes the general proposition that use of force is 
contrary to the Fourth Amendment if it is excessive under 
objective standards of reasonableness.” Id. at 198 (citation 
omitted). And Garner held that “[deadly] force may not be 
used unless it is necessary to prevent . . . escape and the officer 
has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the 
officer or others.” 471 U.S. at 3. 
 
 But in most cases, a plaintiff must show that a right is 
clearly established because “the violative nature of particular 
conduct [was] clearly established.’” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. 
Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) (quoting Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308). In 
other words, “settled law,” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590, must 
“‘squarely govern[]’ the specific facts at issue,” see Kisela v. 
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting Mullenix, 136 
S. Ct. at 309). The Supreme Court has explained that a plaintiff 
may satisfy this standard by “identify[ing] a case where an 
officer acting under similar circumstances as [the defendant 
officer] was held to have violated the [constitutional provision 
at issue].” White, 137 S. Ct. at 552. 
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 For qualified-immunity purposes, “clearly established 
rights are derived either from binding Supreme Court and 
Third Circuit precedent or from a ‘robust consensus of cases of 
persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals.’” Bland v. City 
of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); 
see Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589–90 (“To be clearly established, a 
legal principle must . . . [be] dictated by controlling authority 
or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority[.]” 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). So we first 
look to factually analogous precedents of the Supreme Court 
and the Third Circuit. See L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 
235, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2016). Then, we examine persuasive 
authorities, such as our nonprecedential opinions and decisions 
from other Courts of Appeals. See id. We may consider all 
relevant cases under this inquiry, not just those cited by the 
parties. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). 
 
V 
 
 On appeal, Trooper Bartelt argues that he did not violate 
a clearly established right. We agree because, at the time, no 
Supreme Court precedent, Third Circuit precedent, or robust 
consensus of persuasive authority had held that “an officer 
acting under similar circumstances as [Trooper Bartelt] . . . 
violated the Fourth Amendment.” See White, 137 S. Ct. at 552. 
Because the events here occurred on May 25, 2011, we will 
consider only precedents that clearly established rights as of 
that date. See Bryan v. United States, 913 F.3d 356, 363 (3d 
Cir. 2019). 
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A 
 
 First, we consider whether Trooper Bartelt violated a 
right that was clearly established by Supreme Court precedent.5 
He did not. 
 
 The closest factually analogous Supreme Court 
precedent, Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, is instructive. 
Kisela involved a May 2010 police standoff bearing some 
similarity to the standoff between Trooper Bartelt and 
Gibbons. Id. at 1150–51. In Kisela, the Supreme Court held 
that an officer did not violate a clearly established right by 
shooting a suspect who was armed with a knife. Id. at 1154–
55. The suspect had not responded to at least two police 
commands to drop the knife and “had been acting erratically” 
before the police arrived. Id. at 1151. And the officer “had mere 
seconds to assess the potential danger to [a bystander who was 
less than six feet away].” Id. at 1153.  
 
5 The District Court identified the clearly established right that 
Trooper Bartelt may have violated as follows: “an officer may 
not use deadly force against a suspect unless the officer 
reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious 
bodily injury to the officer or others.” A28 (quoting Lamont v. 
New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Garner, 
472 U.S. at 3, 11)). We disagree because the District Court 
viewed the “right” at too “high [a] level of generality.” See City 
of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019). As the 
Supreme Court has explained, “Garner . . . do[es] not by 
[itself] create clearly established law outside ‘an obvious 
case.’” White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (citation omitted). 
 This is not an obvious case. The facts here show that a 
reasonable officer could have perceived that Gibbons posed “a 
serious threat of immediate harm to others.” Davenport, 870 
F.3d at 281 (collecting cases and observing that “courts have 
found ‘obvious’ cases [based on Garner] only in the absence 
of a serious threat of immediate harm to others”); cf. Kane v. 
Barger, 902 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding that a 
violation was “obvious” because “it seem[ed] absurd to 
analyze whether the right . . . was clearly established by case 
law at the time of [the defendant’s] conduct”). We thus reject 
the District Court’s clearly established analysis. 
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 The Supreme Court distinguished “the specific facts at 
issue” in Kisela from the facts in precedents that a lower court 
had relied on to find that the defendant had violated a clearly 
established right. Id. The Supreme Court assumed that the 
defendant had violated a right but held that neither Supreme 
Court nor circuit precedent was factually analogous enough to 
clearly establish the right. Id. at 1152–53. It identified several 
facts that distinguished the scenario it considered from the 
factual scenarios of earlier precedents: (1) “[the suspect] was 
armed with a large knife”; (2) the suspect “ignored officers’ 
orders to drop the weapon”; (3) the suspect “was within 
striking distance of [a bystander]”; and (4) “the situation 
unfolded in less than a minute.” Id. at 1154. It concluded that 
these factual differences “leap[ed] from the page” and that the 
unlawfulness of the “new set of facts” in Kisela was not clearly 
established by Supreme Court or circuit caselaw. Id. (citation 
omitted).  
 
 Many of the same distinguishing facts are present here: 
(1) Gibbons was armed with a gun; (2) Gibbons ignored 
Trooper Bartelt’s orders to drop his gun; (3) Gibbons was 
easily within range to shoot Troopers Bartelt or Conza; and (4) 
the situation unfolded in “seconds.” See A16–18. 
 
 In sum, Trooper Bartelt did not violate a right that had 
been clearly established by Supreme Court precedent. 
 
B 
 
 Next, we consider whether Trooper Bartelt violated a 
right that had been clearly established by Third Circuit 
precedent. None of our relevant precedents present a 
sufficiently similar factual scenario at the “high ‘degree of 
specificity’” that Supreme Court precedent requires. See 
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (citations omitted). So we conclude 
that he did not. 
 
 We begin by examining our closest factually analogous 
precedential opinion, Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 
2002). In Bennett, we held that a police officer violated the 
Fourth Amendment by shooting an armed, suicidal suspect 
during a prolonged police standoff. See id. at 136. We 
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recounted the facts in Bennett by quoting the district court’s 
factual summary: 
 
The state police were called to the courtyard of a 
group of apartment buildings on the evening of 
January 4, 1994 to confront [the suspect], who 
they soon learned was distraught at being unable 
to see his girlfriend. He was armed with a single 
shot shotgun that he held vertically in front of 
him, with the barrel pointed up at his head, and 
the stock facing down. He was “very deliberate 
in holding the gun toward himself or in the air,” 
and did not point the gun at anyone, including 
state troopers. He stated that he wanted to kill 
himself. As the troopers took up positions 
surrounding him in the open area between the 
apartment buildings, he became agitated and 
began moving toward a group of them[] but 
stopped for perhaps four seconds before he was 
shot. [The police officer defendant] was 
positioned 80 yards behind [the suspect] when he 
fired. Almost an hour passed between the time 
the state troopers first arrived on the scene, and 
the time [the suspect] was shot. 
 
[The suspect] admittedly was angry and defiant 
in the face of a group of determined, armed state 
troopers. 
 
Id. at 135 n.2 (alterations in original omitted) (quoting Bennett 
v. Murphy, 127 F. Supp. 2d 689, 690–91 (W.D. Pa. 2000)). The 
Bennett district court also noted that the suspect was around 
twenty-seven yards from the nearest group of police officers 
when the defendant shot him. See 127 F. Supp. 2d at 691 
(describing the suspect as “one third” of eighty yards from the 
nearest group of officers). And in a later nonprecedential 
opinion, we observed that the suspect had refused commands 
to drop his firearm but obeyed other commands. See Bennett v. 
Murphy, 120 F. App’x 914, 917–18 & 918 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, we opined that the suspect “did not pose a threat to 
anyone but himself.” Bennett, 274 F.3d at 136. Thus, we held 
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that the defendant police officer’s deadly force was 
“objectively excessive” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id.  
 
 Three factual differences lead us to conclude that 
Trooper Bartelt did not violate a clearly established right. First, 
Trooper Bartelt’s pre-standoff knowledge of Gibbons differs 
from the Bennett officer’s pre-standoff knowledge of the 
suspect. Trooper Bartelt was aware of several facts from which 
he could reasonably conclude that Gibbons posed a threat to 
others: Gibbons had violated a restraining order; Gibbons was 
carrying and earlier that evening had brandished a firearm; and 
Gibbons was reportedly mentally ill and may not have been 
taking his medication. Each of these facts would lead a 
reasonable officer entering an encounter with Gibbons to 
perceive that Gibbons presented an increased risk of harm 
compared with the suspect in Bennett.  
 
 Second, Gibbons was much closer to and less compliant 
with Trooper Bartelt than the suspect in Bennett. Gibbons was 
just seven to fifteen yards from Trooper Bartelt, unlike the 
suspect in Bennett who was eighty yards away from the 
defendant officer. Trooper Bartelt could not rely on closer 
officers to give commands to Gibbons and evaluate his 
compliance. See Bennett, 120 F. App’x at 918 n.1 (noting that 
the suspect was complying with commands from closer 
officers when the defendant officer shot him). Instead, Trooper 
Bartelt was the closest officer to Gibbons. So when Gibbons 
ignored Trooper Bartelt’s orders to drop his gun, Trooper 
Bartelt was the officer with the best opportunity to evaluate 
whether Gibbons posed a threat to others. A reasonable officer 
would have difficulty concluding that using force against the 
distant, comparatively compliant, and unknown suspect in 
Bennett was clearly factually analogous to using force against 
the much-closer, noncompliant Gibbons, whose recent 
behavior was known to Trooper Bartelt.  
 
 Third, Trooper Bartelt’s standoff with Gibbons lasted 
only moments, unlike the nearly hour-long standoff in Bennett. 
Trooper Bartelt’s interaction with Gibbons was over within 
seconds of his arrival on the scene. He necessarily “had mere 
seconds to assess the potential danger” posed by the armed and 
non-compliant Gibbons. See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153. The 
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Supreme Court stressed the importance of this kind of temporal 
difference when conducting the clearly established inquiry. See 
id. at 1154 (distinguishing a case involving a standoff that 
lasted “roughly 40 minutes” and a case involving a standoff 
that “unfolded in less than a minute,” finding that a 
constitutional violation in the former did not clearly establish 
a right that was applicable to the latter). So the substantially 
shorter duration of Trooper Bartelt’s standoff with Gibbons 
further distinguishes the facts here from those in Bennett. 
 
 For these reasons, although Bennett may be the most 
analogous precedent from our Court, its holding does not 
“‘squarely govern[]’ the specific facts at issue” here. See id. at 
1151 (citation omitted). And because no other Third Circuit 
precedent is factually analogous to this case, we conclude that 
Trooper Bartelt did not violate a clearly established right under 
our precedent.6 
 
C 
 
 Finally, we consider whether Trooper Bartelt violated a 
right that had been clearly established by a robust consensus of 
persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals. The caselaw of 
 
6 Our decision in Lamont supports our conclusion that Trooper 
Bartelt did not violate a clearly established right under our 
precedent. 637 F.3d 177. There, police officers did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force against a suspect 
who made abrupt movements that a reasonable officer could 
perceive as drawing a firearm. Id. at 183–84. Lamont shows 
that if Gibbons had been unarmed but made abrupt movements 
that an officer could perceive as drawing a firearm, Trooper 
Bartelt would not have violated clearly established law by 
using deadly force against him.  
 Gibbons had already drawn a firearm when Trooper 
Bartelt shot him. As we explained in Lamont, “[p]olice officers 
do not enter into a suicide pact when they take an oath to 
uphold the Constitution.” Id. at 183. Given Lamont, we cannot 
say that Bennett “move[s this] case beyond the otherwise ‘hazy 
border between excessive and acceptable force.’” See Kisela, 
138 S. Ct. at 1153 (citation omitted). 
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our sister circuits prohibits the use of deadly force against non-
threatening suspects, even when they are armed and suicidal.7 
But none of the cases that stand for this general principle 
involve the “high ‘degree of specificity’” required to clearly 
establish a right under the circumstances Trooper Bartelt faced. 
See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (citation omitted). 
 
 James argues that several cases from our sister circuits 
are factually analogous enough to show that Trooper Bartelt 
violated a clearly established right. See Weinmann v. McClone, 
787 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2015) (denying qualified immunity 
when an officer used deadly force against an armed suspect); 
Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); see 
also Connors v. Thompson, 647 F. App’x 231 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(same); Glenn v. Washington Cty., 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 
2011) (same). Even if these cases bear some factual similarity 
to the scenario Trooper Bartelt faced, we do not agree that they 
create a clearly established right. And in any event, they were 
all decided after the events here (i.e., after May 25, 2011). 
Thus, they “‘could not have given fair notice to [Trooper 
Bartelt]’ because a reasonable officer is not required to foresee 
judicial decisions that do not yet exist.” See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1154 (quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 200 n.4). 
 
 Thus, we conclude that Trooper Bartelt did not violate 
a right that had been clearly established by a robust consensus 
of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals.  
 
VI 
 
For these reasons, Trooper Bartelt did not violate a 
clearly established right by using deadly force against Gibbons. 
“When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects ‘all but 
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
law.’ [Trooper Bartelt] deserves neither label[.]” See Ashcroft 
 
7 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1159–61 
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding that using deadly force against a 
suicidal, knife-wielding, and non-threatening suspect violated 
one of the suspect’s constitutional rights); Mercado v. City of 
Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1157–58 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); 
Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898, 903 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(same). 
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v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (citations omitted). The 
District Court erred by concluding otherwise and denying him 
qualified immunity.  
 
We will reverse the District Court’s orders as to Trooper 
Bartelt and remand this case with instructions to grant 
judgment to him based on qualified immunity. 
